SA Untersturmführer (2nd Lieutenant) Stieger, the Leader of the Rann District Settlement Staff, reports from the enclave on December 12, 1941:

“The news arriving here in the Gottschee enclave from the first settlers [to the Save/Sotla area] is shattering to those about to leave. Enragement has spread throughout the enclave, the people believing they have been universally deceived, especially by Lampeter and his VGL which had purposefully concealed the settlement area, kept the poor conditions there secret and even made unrealistic promises. Some Gottscheer reacted spontaneously and resorted to individual action”. 116 The farmer R.K., whose village was among the last to leave the enclave, writes:

“When it became known that our homeland to be was in the German occupied Slovenia on the Croatian border, a large part of the population again actively opposed the resettlement. This, in spite of the fact that the resettlement was already in full swing. These opponents sought ways to extract themselves from the noose, but found no way out and were forced to accept their destiny. There were many cases where the re-settlers brought their property from the rail station back to their original villages at their expense. But the VGL immediately stepped in to frighten these people. They told the re-settlers that they no longer owned their property; neither house nor land, all is now in the hands of the Resettlement Authority which will not return anything. The people were left with no choice other than bring their possessions to the station for the second time”. 

The anger of the resettlers had turned to despondency. The simple farmers could not stand up to the tactics of the DUG (Deutsche Umsiedlung Gesellschaft – German Resettling Authority) or the VGL.

This was not the case with the bourgeoisie of Gottschee city. This group was not willing to resettle without defined assurances regarding their economic and financial future. And given the disheartening reports from those who had already arrived there, they lost trust not only in the VGL but also in the Resettling Authority and decided to resist.

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On Jan. 2, 1942, Dr. Redell, the deputy head of the DUB (Deutscher Umsiedlung Bevollmächtigter – German Resettling Plenipotentiary), the Civil Resettling Authority and the Reich’s intermediary to the Italians, with his office in Ljubljana telegraphed the SS-Stabshauptamt in Berlin, the German Foreign Office and the RKFDV office in Maribor the news that the “Gottschee City people are resisting resettlement and are prepared to withdraw their agreement if their resettlement is not postponed until March”. The telegram also said:

“We made them aware that such a postponement is not possible and since the VGL has not taken a position against their stand, we believe they support these wishes. Believe it urgent that the Reichskommissar impress on the VGL that the German Reich is bound by the Resettlement Contract to the agreed upon dates. I have asked Stabsführer Laforce, head of the RKFDV station in Maribor, to immediately explain the situation to the re-settlers and the VGL”.  117

The above request for help was prompted by a letter of protest from a group of sixty one Gottscheer (of the City) to Dr. Wollert, the head of the DUB. 118  The letter, which was drafted at the initiative of Dr. Arko, explained their position in six specific points:
 
1.  “We had been promised, repeatedly, that the Rann [Brežice] triangle would be an exclusively Gottscheer settlement and that in this area foreign influence will be excluded. Now we have come to realize that we have become a category of second class citizens. All responsible positions there are already occupied by others [Ethnic Germans from Lower Styria] and therefore our interests are not represented as we had wished”.
 
2.   “Our larger vested interests may, due to lack of space, be resettled outside the area.  But only with a guarantee that this is a temporary arrangement”.
 
The lack of space was verified by a delegation of City Gottscheer which was sent to the two cities, Brežice (Rann) and Krško (Gurkfeld) to investigate. Their report was alarming especially when it became known that there were not enough dwellings in the two towns to accommodate the people of Gottschee city. The fact was that of the 300 dwellings requested by Dr. Wollert, the head of the DUB, only 35 were available.119 This was according to a report from SA Untersturmführer (Lieutenant) Stieger, dated Dec. 31, 1941. Those for whom no space remained were to be settled in Upper Krain or Carinthia. 120

3.  “To assure a secure arrangement, representatives of [our] citizens should be elected.  Their nomination should come from the undersigned group”.

4.  “Businesses and enterprises in the settlement area should be turned over to Gottscheer if they are presently in non-Gottscheer hands”.

5.   “Of special importance is the sale of the properties in the [Gottschee] City. It would be unacceptable to all of us if these properties were to be sold or turned over to EMONA [the private Italian society handling the purchase of the Gottscheer properties for the Italian government] prior to our departure”.
 
6.   “And of special concern is that our Savings and Loan Bank, which we have maintained during our most difficult times of oppression, be fully reconstituted in the settling area as a Gottscheer institution, including its reserves of 400,000 RM [Reichsmark]”. [These reserves were to be surrendered to Italy as part of Article 6 of the Contract.]
 
Given these disheartening reports, the Gottscheer of the City had lost trust in the VGL and the Reich. A Reich that had promised to resettle them as a unit into an area within which they could function as an autonomous group. Now it seemed to them that the Settlement Authority’s civil officials, predominantly ethnic Germans of Lower Styria or Windische Slovene, were denying them that promise.

In reaction to the appeal for help on Jan. 2 by Dr. Redell, the official responsible for placing the Gottschee City resettlers in the new area, SS-Untersturmführer (2nd Lieutenant) Bliss and SS-Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Liupold Schallermayer, both of the Maribor RKFDV office, left immediately for the enclave on Jan. 3, to rectify the situation. But on the way there, they stopped to see Dr. Redell in Ljubljana where they also met a representative of the Foreign Office of the Reich and Dr. Knuth, the DUB Resettlement Commissioner resident in Gottschee City. Also present was Josef Schober, the Volksgruppenführer who was the official leader of the Gottscheer. (if in name only).
 
Both Dr. Redell and the official from the Foreign office explained that the “uneasiness of the Gottscheer resettlers was due to false rumors originating from members of the VGL”. Dr. Knuth agreed with this and even identified Lampeter as one of the “rumormongers”. 121

What Schober contributed to this meeting is not known nor why he was there. The German officials, however, learned that Schober was uncomfortable in his role as Volksgruppenführer. He wanted to resign from this position since his functions had been assumed by Lampeter who wished to formally become the leader of the Gottscheer. The officials persuaded him not to resign and he agreed to accompany them to the meeting in the City. 122

Later that day the four German officials as well as Josef Schober, met with about 100 Gottschee City residents who wished to withdraw their formal request to resettle. Lampeter, who arrived at this meeting late, defended their written protests by claiming that “the allocated houses are worse that those in Gottschee, in the best of them sit Slovenes and officials of the Reich; that the claimed high profits of businesses there are misleading”. Bliss countered that Lampeter’s claims were rumors and called them “criminal”. The assembled Gottscheer were astonished over this dispute by two members of the elite SS formation of the Reich, ending in a public accusation of Lampeter; the beginning of his downfall and disgrace.
 
Bliss, the head of the SS-Settlement Staff of Lower Styria called “Südmark”, had requested the meeting at which he planned to accomplish three important objectives (see Die Umsiedlung, pg. 128) to dispel their doubt and restore enthusiasm for the resettlement:

1.  Disprove and negate the causes of the written complaints.

2.  Restore enthusiasm for the resettlement.

3.  Discover the head of the group spreading rumors.

Regarding Point 1.   “The Gottscheer were, after his clarifications, deeply ashamed and with tears in their eyes begged him to ignore their despondency. The VGL had failed them totally and it had spread the rumors”.

Regarding Point 2.   “Bliss noted that after his clarifications, the resettlers themselves explained that the reason for the letter of protest was fully attributable to the rumors spread by members of the VGL which gave them the impression that they would place themselves into an absolutely uncertain existence”.
  
Regarding Point 3.   “Bliss concluded categorically that Lampeter was the primary offender”.

Bliss, together with his three colleagues and Schober, achieved all three objectives, the most important being Objectives 1 and 2. The Gottscheer were satisfied with his explanations and now agreed to resettle.

In his Objective 3, Bliss included the following comments in his report of the meeting on Jan. 3, 1942:
 
“Lampeter has, as a result of the various honors bestowed on him for his work in the Ethnic Group, become a megalomaniac and is for further German political purposes, absolutely unusable. As an SS leader, I am ashamed to see such a political child in the uniform of the SS and in the rank of a Sturmbannführer. Had I been given his assignment and produced such problems, I would deserve to be demoted and taken to a concentration camp for retraining. The future leaders of the Gottscheer must, therefore, under no circumstances be taken from the ranks of the VGL but must be replaced by activists from the Reich” 123
 
This was the political death sentence of Lampeter declared by Bliss, one of the most important officials responsible for the integration of the Gottscheer in their new land.

The report of Bliss resulted in a rapid disintegration of Lampeter’s position and stature. The report was seconded by Laforce, his supervisor and head of the Maribor RKFDV station; it was distributed to all relevant officials including Gauleiter Uiberreither, who for many months had been irritated by Lampeter’s arrogant behavior.
 
- - - -

The process that led to Lampeter’s decline and ultimate political demise had actually started on December 29, 1941 after he and his staff leader Richard Lackner visited the Save Sotla area to verify the unfavorable reports arriving back in the enclave. After finding the conditions the arriving settlers were facing there unacceptable “due to neglect by the Settlement Authority”, he and Lackner drove directly to Maribor to see Laforce, the head of the RKFDV Station to report on what they found and request that the situation be rectified.  Laforce was absent and Lampeter deemed it pointless to discuss the matter with the lower ranking SS-Untersturmführer Bliss.
 
At this juncture, the impulsive Lampeter lost his patience and, ignoring all formalities of the SS hierarchy, decided to present his grievances directly to the highest authority. He describes this in his memoirs written in February, 1942:

“With a present from the Gottscheer Mannschaftsführer to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, the youth leader was sent by the Mannschaftsführer to Berlin on December 29, 1941. There to hand the present directly to the Reichsführer and explain to him the conditions in the settlement region. This was, alas, not to be; the Reichsführer was at the Führer’s headquarters”.

But on the 5th of January, youth leader Richard Lackner did meet with SS-Gruppenführer (Major General) Greifeld, the highest ranking officer under Himmler, and explained the unsatisfactory conditions in the settling region.  Present was SS-Oberführer Hintze, head of the Expulsion Staff “Altreich-Ostmark” at the RKFDV in Berlin, who supported the (Lackner) report. Greifeld already had other reports which described the poor conditions there.  Greifeld told Lackner that this morning he had tasked Hintze to “straighten out the conditions down there”. The only news Lampeter received from Lackner in Berlin was on Jan. 6, in which he stated that until Jan. 3, he had accomplished nothing.

After the meeting on Jan. 3rd with Bliss and the Gottschee City people, Lampeter returned to the settlement area. He found the conditions there “worse than before; without the settlement authorities (Bliss, Schallermayer, etc.) attempting to improve the situation”.
  
For the second time, Lampeter took a dangerous leap over the entire SS hierarchy. On Jan. 9 (prior to having met the returning Lackner) he sent a letter directly to Himmler in which he described the progressively deteriorating conditions which “must not be allowed to continue”. A copy of the letter was mailed to Greifeld sometime later. Consequently, a copy of Lampeter’s letter sent by Himmler to Greifeld was received prior to the one mailed to him by Lampeter directly.  Himmler also ordered Greifeld to conduct a full investigation.
 
Greifeld, the Chief of the Stabshauptamt of the RKFDV, the Ingathering Authority directly under Himmler, was offended by Lampeter’s reckless neglect for protocol as was the entire SS hierarchy below Himmler. Greifeld reacted by sending Hintze (now in Maribor) a telegram on Jan. 15, 1942:

“Lampeter, the head of the Gottschee-Mannschaft, in a letter to the Reichsführer SS dated Jan 9, 1942, grossly exaggerates the apparent difficulties [in the settlement region] which seem to be no more than an attempt to acquire for himself the leadership role [of the Gottscheer]”.

To Hintze, who, had been sent by Greifeld to investigate Lackner’s complaints, this was an order in disguise. He discontinued his investigation and reported that in the settlement area, “all is in order”. (This claim was documented by SS-Obersturmbannführer Wagner, dated Jan 25, 1942. See Die Umsiedlung, pg 132).  Hintze also immediately called for a meeting of all responsible SS station officials, as well as the Gauleiter and the VGL for January 16, 1942.

The five hour long proceedings labeled “Case Lampeter”, were conducted by the Gauleiter. It was in effect a trial of the behavior of the Mannschaftsführer. Three separate issues were on the agenda:

1. The six specific charges listed by Lampeter in his letter to Himmler. All were rejected as inaccurate and dismissed.

2. The events at the protest meeting on Jan 3rd.  Lampeter countered by saying that the meeting had been pointless. “The calming of City people was not necessary since they, having lost their economic basis for survival due to all others having already left, were forced to leave as well”. This callous comment was received as being arrogant by those present. And Hintze charged that “by reporting unfavorable conditions he poured oil into the fire instead of exercising his duty as a National-Socialist and persuading the City people to resettle”.  124

3.   Hintze’s charge had to do mainly with Lampeter’s arrogant deed of twice bypassing the entire SS chain of command. Adding to this was the unacceptable attitude he projected at a Jan. 11, 1942 meeting with the Sturmführers of the villages which had not yet resettled. At that meeting, the contents of which were to be kept secret, Lampeter not only read his letter to Himmler to his subordinates, but also openly criticized the SS Resettling Authority and requested that evidence be collected to further prove its incompetence.

However, six of his Sturmführers, like most of the Gottscheer, no longer had confidence in Lampeter and reported the meeting to the SS.  Hintze openly confronted Lampeter: “To the Sturmführers you have, among other things, said: … “over the head of the Gauleiter and bypassing all responsible SS Stations, I will take my requests directly to Berlin”. 125 The 25 year old Lampeter agreed that he said so, claiming his right to intercede on behalf of the Gottscheer at the highest authority of the Reich).
  
At the end of the hearing, Hintze documented the conclusion arrived at:

“After extensive discussions with Lampeter, I have gained the impression that he is too young and inexperienced for his assigned tasks, as well as the promotion to SS-Sturmbannführer and that he lacks the necessary insight and self discipline such a position requires. I have, therefore, explained to him that I myself will assume the leadership of the Gottscheer militia and wish that he refrain from any further activity in the settlement region.
 
 “This decision also applies to his Staff leader Lackner.  More drastic steps may be taken which may be mitigated by his youth which, however, I doubt. In any event, I hold that a further presence of Lampeter in the settlement region is undesirable and that he, regardless of the outcome of further proceedings, be immediately recalled to the Altreich”. 126

Three days after January 16, Hintze informed Greifeld in Berlin of the results of the hearing and his recommendations.  But after reading the letter, Dr. Stier, the technical adviser to Greifeld, wrote to Hintze that the removal of the idealistic young leadership be reconsidered since it might affect the allegiance of the ingathered Gottscheer. He suggested that either Lampeter or Sturm remain as leaders to prevent creating an impression that these former fighters are being sacrificed. Hintze replied that no one wishes to remove Sturm, Lackner or Schober, but that the Gauleiter (who had the final word) himself concluded that it would be politically untenable to keep Lampeter in his position.  Hintze also added that the leadership of the Sturms has been assumed by Laforce himself.
 
This conclusion, reached by the members of the RKFDV, terminated Lampeter’s leadership of the Gottscheer Germans. “The discrepancy between the conception of discipline and obedience of these SS-men and the unorthodox behavior of Lampeter was so large that a compromise was no longer possible”. 127

- - - -

The events suggest that Lampeter’s behavior played directly into the hands of the Ingathering Authority of the Reich which demanded, as the end result, the termination of the ethnic character of the ingathered groups. This was formulated in 1940 by SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. Fähnrich, head of the Section I, directly under SS-Gruppenführer Greifeld, Chief of the RKFDV in 1939. Paragraph 5 of the Ingathering Policy states:

“After the Ingathering of an Ethnic Group into the Reich, the Ethnic Group Leadership ceases to exist since over the Ethnic Group stands the Reich.

“The concepts defining the Balkan Germans, the Wolhynian and Bessarabian German, [Gottscheer, South Tyrolean], etc…, must, as quickly as possible, be eliminated.” 128

Greifeld reminded Gauleiter Uiberreither and Deputy of Reichskommissar Himmler of this policy in the letter (stamped Secret) dated October 31, 1941. A copy had been sent also to the Chief of the Maribor branch of the RKFDV, SS-Sturmbannführer Laforce:

 “From your letter of October 12, 1941, I see that you are not fully oriented regarding the developments within the leadership of the Gottscheer. I ask you therefore, not to take sides in these intra group quarrels. The present leadership [VGL] should for now remain, since only through a unified and firm leadership is a frictionless resettling guaranteed. This recognition of the present leadership must however not lead to a situation where persons who politically have not kept pace with the others, but have doubtlessly earned great honors regarding the upkeep of Germandom, are vilified. [Those on the “List of politically undesirables”, i.e. Dr. Arko, etc.]

“After the resettlement of the Gottscheer to Lower Styria, I ask that care be taken that the Ethnic Group as such ceases to exist and that the Gottscheer, unconditionally, integrate themselves into Lower Styria and into Germandom as a whole.

 [signed] Greifeld, SS-Gruppenführer”. 129

It is evident from the above that the “Case Lampeter” provided a convenient set of circumstances for the SS to enforce the Ingathering Policy of the Reich.

- - - -

The chastened Lampeter, relieved of his function as leader of the Gottscheer Mannschaft, frustrated in his attempt to become leader of the Gottscheer Germans in the Reich, in February 1942 writes his memoir; his own Lagebericht (Situation Report) “The Gottscheer Ethnic Group, 1930-1942”. His damaged ego is clearly evident in Part III he called “Die Letzte Entwicklung” (The Final Development).
 
Loosely quoted excerpts from Part III are: (The entire version is available on www.Gottschee.de):

 “The VGL is being phased out so that the resettlers can be led according to fundamental principles of the Reich.

“Sturmführers 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 and 10 have been discharged. Among them are some of the best. They are being replaced with those who in the old homeland stood apart; were the strongest opponents of the organized VGF, or who even were Slovenes. Reactionaries such as Dr. Arko are especially favored and one hears that his “Gesangsverein” will be revived under his direction.

“The Gottscheer Germans gravely contemplate these events, since they know both their former leaders as well as their replacements. A confidence in the [SS] Settlement Authority no longer exists. Their inner doubts are thereby reinforced. ….  They tell themselves: ‘The greatest idealists, the preachers of Germany and its National-Socialism are being cut down and in their place come men who once were their fiercest opponents’. The general mood can, in contrast to the one in the old homeland, be described only as negative. The disappointment they were forced to experience on their arrival in the Reich led to depression and apathy. The Gottscheer faithfully followed the call of the Führer. They believed they were returning to the Reich to enter its orderly existence.  In this they were disappointed from the first day on.
  
“All these avoidable mistakes, none caused by the VGL, produced only scandalous conditions in the settlement region, so that today the negative and the inferior feel comfortable while the capable believe that there is no place for them here and leave for Inner Germany.

“Especially senseless is the attack on the honor of their [Gottscheer] tribe. [He describes a public event at which the Gottscheer dialect was used]. After being asked by a German civilian if they are Gottscheer, the man said: ‘Too bad I do not have my pistol on me; I would quickly show you what I think of your gypsy language’. Generally, the Ethnic Group is referred to only dismissively.

“Depressing is the fact that, here in the Reich, some of the Gendarmes are Slovenes who are disrespectful to the Gottscheer and force them to speak Slovene. Also great concern exists regarding the allocation of properties. Because of their recent experience, confidence in the Settlement Authority does not exist.

“Today it must be concluded that, after a few weeks in the Reich, the Gottscheer Group has been stripped of its bearing which served them so well during the 600 years among the Slovene. The only item which was faultlessly accomplished by the [SS] Settlement Staff was the total annihilation of an organization [the VGL] surely rare in the history of Ethnic Germans and the destruction of their treasured property; the idealism, the initiative and the joyous self-sacrifice.  And all this places a heavy burden on the belief in Germany”.

- - - -

As is apparent in the last paragraph above, the disillusioned fanatic does not differentiate the nine year old Nazi Reich from a Germany that for centuries had been proud of its liberal traditions and cultural achievements. A Reich, which had blinded its people with the curse of extreme nationalism and racial superiority. Perhaps he never would; his ideology too deeply ingrained as he describes elsewhere in his memoir:
   
“In National-Socialism, which found its way into the remote Gottschee only after its assumption of power in 1933, the youth discovered its true life’s purpose, the recognized signpost to their aspirations and willingness to act”.

- - - -

The now deeply wounded Lampeter, his ego bruised, his fanatical idealism challenged and his until now unshaken belief in the Reich heavily burdened is, certainly at that point in time, incapable of introspection. Feeling betrayed by those he idolized as the best of the super race, he is incapable of reflecting on his own betrayal; the betrayal of his people from whom he withheld the truth and whom he coerced and pressured to get them to leave their ancient heritage and their lands.

He is also blind to the fact that he and his once loyal subordinates are now being blamed by the Gottscheer re-settlers for the loss of their homeland; for luring them into what they see as something inferior and far less than the Promised Land in which they are now being stripped of what they cherished for centuries; their uniqueness as an Ethnic Group.

- - - -

But Lampeter and his still loyal intimate circle were not totally discouraged.  After all, Lampeter’s direct superiors were neither Bliss, nor Laforce, nor Hintze nor Greifeld. It was Himmler himself who had personally promoted him to SS-Sturmbannführer and accepted him as leader of the Gottscheer. Any dismissal, Lampeter believed, would have to come from Himmler himself. Had not Himmler and Hitler promised the Gottscheer in Maribor on April 26, 1941, a closed settlement area including full autonomy after the resettlement ?
 
It is evident that Lampeter was not aware of Himmler’s Ingathering policy as defined by Dr. Fähndrich (see Die Umsiedlung, pg. 145):

“After the Ingathering of an Ethnic Group into the Reich, the Ethnic Group Leadership ceases to exist since over the Ethnic Group stands the Reich”.

Or of Greifeld’s “secret” letter to the Gauleiter dated October 31, 1941:

“After the resettlement of the Gottscheer to Lower Styria, I ask that care be taken that the Ethnic Group as such ceases to exist and that the Gottscheer integrate themselves unconditionally into Lower Styria and into Germandom as a whole”.

But the presumptuous leaders of the Gottscheer Germans continue to act in a sovereign manner. And Lampeter, who after his dismissal on January 16, 1942 has no formal role behaves as if he still had. All to the great annoyance of the SS officers of the ingathering hierarchy, the Gauleiter of Styria and the officials of the “Steirischer Heimatbund”.

- - - -

In view of Hitler’s Ingathering Directives, transformed into policy by Himmler and now being executed by both the Gauleiter and the SS-Staff of the RKFDV, it is clear that the assurance of autonomy the VGL received in Maribor on April 26, 1941 was no more than an empty promise. This must have become evident even to the disillusioned Lampeter who continued to hope for favorable news from Berlin.

But even more troubling to Lampeter, his VGL and other Gottscheer all now citizens of the Third Reich, was the realization that they were now at a level no different than that of the “inferior” Slovenes of Lower Styria, all scheduled to become German citizens of equal rank. SS-Untersturmführer Dolezalek quotes the Gottscheer: “We thought that we were leaving for Germany, but ended up among Slovene bandits.  Did we not resettle to get away from them and now we are again surrounded by them?? And even worse; there are now “Windische” and other Slovene in administrative positions giving orders as equals!!” 130

The makeup of the Rann District (Settling Area A), with the ingathering/expulsion completed, is described by the Berlin Stabshauptamt of the RKFDV on April 13, 1943 as follows:

“Slovene [who were allowed to stay] 8,000,  Gottscheer Germans  12,500,  Dobrutschka Germans 250, Bessarabian Germans 500,  Buchenland Germans 200,  South Tyrol Germans  400, Obersteiermark Germans  600.  In the Settling Area A, as many businesses remained in the hands of the prior [Slovene] residents as came (or should have come) into ownership of the Gottscheer. In fact, however, the property size of the prior residents is smaller”. 131
  
The “Promised Land” is obviously neither a closed settlement, nor is it autonomous and controlled by the VGL. Half of its businesses are in the hands of Slovene; the ratio of Gottscheer vs. non-Gottscheer [most of them Slovene] is nearly 1:1, i.e., less than it was in the enclave. And the use of Gottscheer dialect, the only mark of former ethnic identity, is either discouraged or forbidden and the Leader of the District is a non-Gottscheer. 132

All objectives of the “Ingathering Policy” had been accomplished.

- - - -

Since there was to be no autonomous Gottscheer-German enclave in Lower Styria, the new arrivals became a part of the Brežice (Rann) District of the “Steirischer Heimatbund”. Already on April 24, 1941, its leader, Bundesführer Franz Steindl announced that, “on order of the Gauleiter, the Heimatbund is the sole and total organization of all loyal residents of Lower Styria”.  The Rann District, like all other districts in Styria was administered by a District Leader [Kreisleiter] appointed by the Gauleiter. In the fall of 1941, Gauleiter Uiberreither had planned to appoint Lampeter as Kreisleiter of the Rann District. But due to Lampeter’s unacceptable behavior, especially in December 1941/January 1942, the post went to Adolf Swoboda, a member of the Nazi party, the NSDAP. 133

In March 1942, the branch of the SS-Ansiedlungsstab called “Südmark”, the organization responsible for the now completed “Ingathering” into Lower Styria was disbanded and Bliss its head, transferred out. What still remained to be done was the distribution of the land among the arrivals and the final allocation of residences to the “Ingathered”. This was to be accomplished by SA Standartenführer (Colonel) Erwin Seftschnig, with Laforce as his Deputy and SS-Untersturmführer Dolezalek as the officer responsible for surveying the land.
 
- - - -

In mid March of 1942, the Gauleiter visited (for the first time) the settlement area. There he discovered that the morale of the ingathered Gottscheer Germans was very low and to improve it, he decided to return some of the members of the former VGL into leadership positions.
 
For this the Gauleiter created, on May 16, 1942, the “Leadership of the Gottscheer Germans”. (Distinctly different from the former “Leadership of the Ethnic Group”, the VGL). He appointed Lampeter as its head with Martin Sturm as his deputy and placed them both under Swoboda, the Leader of the Rann District of the “Steirischer Heimatbund”.

But the “Leadership” had very little of the power and influence it formerly had in the enclave. The majority of the Gottscheer Germans had no further confidence in their former leaders. Even the mass rally, organized by the “Steirischer Heimatbund” at Lampeter’s urging and held in late spring of 1942 on the large sport field of Brežice (Rann), did not lift the spirits of the “ingathered”. The rally, modeled on those held in the enclave during the summer of 1941, included not only the Gottscheer Stürme and Hitler Youth groups, (I among them), but also groups of the “Steirischer Heimatbund” and units of the local German military. It was an impressive affair but produced little improvement in the general mood of the former Gottscheer.

In the structure created by the Gauleiter, neither Lampeter nor Sturm received much support from the District Leadership under Swoboda. Apart from receiving a salary, they had no office staff and no automobile that would allow them to visit people spread out over a distance of 90 km. And since the new “Leadership of the Gottscheer Germans” was not producing the expected results, Lampeter was relieved by Himmler of his political duties at the end of June 1942 and transferred into the “Waffen SS-Division Frundsberg” in Stalsund, Germany as an ordinary soldier. After training, he was transferred to “Waffen SS-Division Nordland” and sent to the Russian front where he was severely wounded.

After his recovery, he attended officer training school and on August 30, 1944 he was promoted to SS-Untersturmführer [2nd Lieutenant] in the Waffen SS-Reserve. During the next four months he is with a reserve regiment in Buchenwald. From there he was recalled (on Jan 1, 1945) to the SS-Staatsamt in Berlin, (where he still had his title as Sturmbannführer, equiv. to Major, in the political branch of the SS), and sent to Rann to help build up the Volkssturm and battle the Partisans.
 
Early in 1942, Richard Lackner was offered the responsibility for the “Windische Youth” in the “Steirischer Heimatbund” of the Rann District, an office which, according to his own admission, he staffed mainly with Gottscheer. In 1943 he was transferred to the “Heimatbund” office in Rann where he got into conflict with Bundesführer Steindl who accused him of being a non-cooperative Gottscheer.  He resigned and, according to his own admission, voluntarily joined the SS-Division “Totenkopf”, (“Deadhead”, the most infamous of all SS Divisions) in which he remained until the end of the war.
   
After June 1942, Lampeter’s position was assumed by Martin Sturm who signed his name as “Leader of the Gottscheer Germans” until the Stabshauptamt in Berlin, on July 28, 1942, forbade him to use this title. As the “agricultural adviser” on matters related to the ingathered, he was henceforth to sign any official document only with his given and family name.
 
And when at the end of 1942, the “Steirischer Heimatbund” assumed all political matters related to the Gottscheer Germans, all other remnants of the once sovereign and powerful VGL of the Ethnic Group arrived at their ultimate end.

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And what about the people of the Ethnic Group? On this, the Reverend Alois Krisch, the once so vocal supporter of the resettlement and defender of the VGL, writes the following in his memoir:

“Now I must say that it was stressed to our people by officials in the Reich, ‘we no longer recognize either Slovene or Gottscheer; here we have only Lower Styrians’. Some of these gentlemen tried to suppress our Gottscheer dialect.  To which we replied: ‘As long as there are other German dialects we will speak ours’.  When one time in an air raid shelter a [Gottscheer] mother rebuked her young son in her dialect, a nearby teacher told her, ‘here we speak only German’. After I told her ours was a very old German dialect, she remained silent.

“Not all 12,000 Gottscheer came to the Rann/Brežice region. Many were settled 100 km or more away so that they were completely separated from our people. Some, the “A” cases, were sent to the Altreich [inner Germany] and so forever lost to the Ethnic Group. Many to other distant places, business men to other towns, all are no longer part of the community of our people. We have become far fewer.

“Here in each village, there are also Slovene families, more than we had among us before; in Rann they are in the majority.  In addition, settled among us are many from South Tyrol and from Bessarabia. The way we are being treated does not give us much hope. Many said even then, that as soon as possible after the war, they will find another place in the world, here they will not stay. A Gottschee community will be no more. Therefore, what readily comes to mind is the thought that we Gottscheer belong to the fairytale:

“Once upon a time …”!


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